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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1998, National Basketball Association (“NBA”) commissioner David 
Stern grew a “lockout beard” for nearly half a year, declaring that it would 
remain intact until the league and union came to an agreement and resumed 
the basketball season.1 Currently, the threat of yet another beard, in addition to 
another truncated or cancelled season, looms over the NBA and up until very 
recently, lingered over the National Football League (“NFL”).2 
Within the last several months, the NBA and NFL’s collective bargaining 
agreements (“CBA”) have expired, leaving both leagues with serious doubt 
regarding the cancellation or delay of their 2011 seasons due to disagreements 
about several mandatory subjects of collective bargaining between their front 
offi ces and unions.3 
As of the date of this article, the NBA has instituted a lockout of its players, 
and the NFL ratifi ed a new ten-year CBA with the National Football League 
Players Association (“NFLPA”) on July 25, 2011 following a fi ve-month long 
lockout.4  
Decertifi cation, or dissolution, of a labor union, is one option available 
to labor organizations—including players’ associations—during collective 
bargaining negotiations.5 With the owners seemingly holding so much power 
and with the longstanding history of lockouts present in both leagues, the 
possibility of decertifying the union with the National Labor Relations Board 
1. See Steve Aschburner, Lockout Revisited, 10 Years Later, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(July 8, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/steve_aschburner/07/08/
lockout.revisited/ (“But the way most people remember it, the league’s angry and newly 
vulnerable chief executive let his retro whiskers grow symbolically from bitter start to 
exhausting fi nish . . . .”).
  2.     See Laura Clawson, NFL Lockout Ends, DAILY KOS (July 25, 2011, 11:36  A.M.), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/07/25/998457/-NFL-lockout-ends (allowing for 
current players to remain in the NFL’s medical plan for life a provision which was hotly 
debated in prior negotiations).  
3.  See Larry Coon, Lockout Looms Over 2010-11 Season, ESPN.COM 
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=coon_
larry&page=lockout-100922 (explaining that if a new CBA is not agreed upon by the NBA 
and players’ union prior to the expiration of the current CBA a league-imposed lockout will 
likely ensue, threatening cancellation of 2011–12 season); Union Head Says Owners Set for 
Lockout, ESPN.COM (Oct. 5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl /news/story?id=5652700 
(explaining that a stumbling block for negotiation of a new CBA is that the NFL, although 
claiming fi nancial diffi culties, will not share its books with the union).
4  See generally, CBA Expires, NBA Locks Out Its Players, ESPN.COM (July 1, 
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=6723645 (detailing both sides of 
the labor dispute which erupted on Friday, July 1, 2011, when its CBA expired); Judy 
Battista, As the Lockout Ends, the Scrambling Begins,  N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011), at 
B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/sports/football/NFL-Union-Labor-
Deal.html?pagewanted=all (“After nearly fi ve months of inactivity by all but a handful of 
negotiators, the NFL sprang to life again Monday when [thirty-two] player representatives 
voted unanimously to recommend approval of a [ten]-year labor deal that owners largely 
approved last Thursday.”).
5. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 528–29 (4th ed. 2010) 
(explaining that if a union votes to decertify, players would no longer have any “affi liation 
with the union and no collective bargaining agreement would be in place”). 
2011]                                STRENGTH IN NUMBERS                             349 
(“NLRB” or “Board”) may appear to be the best option for players.6 Based 
on the likelihood of the owners instituting a lockout following the expiration 
of the CBA, a decertifi cation of the NBA Players Association (“NBPA”) is 
arguably the only tool left to ensure a 2011 season.7 Recent decertifi cation 
efforts in both leagues reveal, however, that such a move can result in a negative 
economic impact on players’ salaries and free agency status.8 Thus, the legal 
options available to a players’ union via the NLRB and provide a more stable 
and successful alternative in dealing with the current labor situations in the 
NBA and the NFL.
This Article will examine, analyze, and propose a solution for the NBPA 
by considering the interplay between the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA” or “Act”), the NLRB, and the history of labor disputes in the NBA 
and the recently revived NFL. Part II will provide a background on collective 
bargaining under the Act, the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and how it applies to 
the unique circumstances of the sports industry.9 Part III will outline the labor 
histories of the NBPA and the NFLPA, including important legal challenges to 
collective bargaining and antitrust restraint claims, and will discuss the current 
situation facing the NBA and NBPA.10 Part IV will analyze the likely negative 
results of decertifi cation in comparison to the strength of a certifi ed players’ 
association, as well as illustrate the disadvantaged position that a union inhabits 
in today’s economy after decertifi cation.11 
II.  BACKGROUND
To safeguard both employers and employees, and to “promote[ ] the fl ow of 
commerce,” the NLRA regulates collective bargaining relationships between 
employers and designated employee unions.12 The history of labor
6. See generally Eric R. McDonough, Escaping Antitrust Immunity—Decertifi cation 
of the National Basketball Players Association, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821 (1997) 
(proposing, in the context of the late 1990s dispute between the NBA and NBPA, that 
decertifi cation of the NBPA, following the expiration of the then-current CBA, would 
allow players to compete in a more free market and receive fair market value wages).
7. Cf. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(explaining that decertifi cation allows players to pursue new strategies, such as challenging 
league practices through a strikes or through antitrust claims).
8. See Decertifi cation: The NFLPA and NBPA’s Nuclear Option, LAW360 
(January 18, 2011), www.constantinecannon.com/pdf_etc/complaw360art011811.pdf 
(explaining that decertifi cation would eliminate guaranteed salaries and pensions 
for the players and the ability to negotiate and control their marketing and licensing 
rights). 
9. See infra Part II (discussing the application of the NLRA to professional sports 
labor disputes). 
10. See infra Part III (analyzing the effects of the most recent NFL decertifi cation and 
the future of the NBA lockout).
11. See infra Part IV (providing an accounting of the labor history and current labor 
relations disputes present in the NBA and the NFL).
12. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) 
(attempting to rectify the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees 
through provision for collective bargaining).  
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law, stemming from the Wagner Act,13 is based around the policy of bringing 
employers and employees together to encourage negotiation and agreement.14 
A.  Collective Bargaining and the NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA to protect the rights of employees and 
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain labor 
and management practices deemed harmful to the workforce and economy of 
the United States.15 In order to carry-out this process, Congress charged the 
NLRB with administering the provisions of the Act.16 The Board has two main 
functions: (1) to determine, through elections, whether a group of employees 
wish to be represented by a union in dealing with their employers and if so, 
by which union; and (2) to prevent “unfair labor practices by private sector 
employers and unions.”17 
The Board’s authority includes oversight of union representative elections 
by employees,18 as well as the governing of elections when employees seek to 
dissolve their labor organization as their exclusive bargaining representative.19 
The Board is also empowered to regulate unfair labor practices by conducting 
investigations, issuing complaints, and petitioning courts for relief.20 One of 
the key aspects of labor practices between labor organizations and employers 
is the mandatory obligation to bargain collectively when a labor unit has 
elected an exclusive bargaining agent.21 This obligation exists “with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” and requires 
that both sides negotiate in “good faith.”22
The process of collective bargaining begins with the selection of an 
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codifi ed as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
14.  See 1 PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 26–27 (4th ed. 
2001) (providing Senator Wagner’s belief that, in an industrial era dominated by large 
corporations, employees needed the ability to bargain together in order to assure their 
rights, with regard to the need for the passage of the Wagner Act).
15. See id. (explaining that the “cornerstone” of the Wagner Act was Section 7, which 
gave employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid and protection”).
16. See § 153 (creating the NLRB to adjudicate, investigate, and enforce the NLRA 
to remedy historically lax enforcement that plagued previous labor laws).
17. What We Do, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2011).
18. § 159(c).
19. See § 159(e) (requiring that thirty percent of eligible employees must petition the 
Board, no sooner than one year after a union had previously been certifi ed, for an election 
to decertify a previously-certifi ed bargaining representative).
20. See § 160(e) (permitting the NLRB to seek relief in federal district court to enjoin 
ongoing unfair labor practices).
21. See § 158(d) (specifying that the duty to bargain in good faith is aimed at the 
consummation of a written collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the 
bargaining representative).
22. See id. (explaining, however, that such an “obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”).
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appropriate unit for the purpose of bargaining with the employer.23 The unit 
representative is selected by a majority of all employees within an appropriate 
unit at the employer’s facility or plant; after the representative collectively 
bargains with an employer over several mandated conditions of employment.24 
The Board’s statutorily-mandated determination of an “appropriate unit for 
collective bargaining” is adjudicated before, and decided by the Board, and 
cannot be overruled or interfered with by a court, unless the Board’s decision 
is arbitrary or capricious.25 Additionally, the Board has the authority to decline 
to exercise jurisdiction over an employment organization if the labor dispute 
does not have a suffi ciently substantial impact on interstate commerce.26 
Once the selection of an exclusive bargaining unit is complete, the 
collective bargaining process ensues. There is a duty for both the employer 
and the unit representative to bargain in good faith, failure to do so is an unfair 
labor practice.27 The language in the Act creates two subject matter categories 
for collective bargaining—mandatory and permissive subjects.28 To be a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, a term must “settle an aspect of 
the relationship between the employer and employees.”29 
23.  For instance, when an employer has two plants that manufacture different 
product lines, the employer may ask the Board to segregate the two into two different 
bargaining units. If the employer is successful, each plant would then have to separately 
select a certifi ed exclusive bargaining representative (union) and each representative would 
have to bargain with the employer separately. See § 159(a)–(b); Ethan Lock, The Scope of 
the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 382 (1989) (“When a 
majority of employees designate a union to represent them, an employer must . . . bargain 
in good faith with the employees’ representatives  . . . .”).
24.  See § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such 
a unit” regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining, including “rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, or other conditions of employment.”).
25.  See NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F.2d 243, 247–50 (9th Cir. 1944) (upholding 
the Board’s determination that sloper and trimmer employees were also qualifi ed cutters 
and that all three could join in an appropriate bargaining unit together). A federal court 
usually defers to an “administrative agency [like the NLRB] because of its own lack of 
experience with issues or the need to protect the authority of the agency.” HARDIN ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 2282.
26.  See § 164(c)(1); see also Sec. Guards & Watchmen Local No. 803 (Yonkers 
Raceway, Inc.), 196 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1972) (declining jurisdiction over the horse racing 
industry, even though racing had “some effect” on interstate commerce).
27.  See § 158(a)(5) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to bargain collectively 
with his employees’ chose representative); § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the 
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . .”).
28.  See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49 
(1958) (holding that an employer cannot insist on acceptance of non-mandatory terms 
as a precondition to reaching an agreement, even when the employer otherwise agrees to 
bargain over mandatory terms).
29.  See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (explaining that there is no penalty or repercussion if 
parties refuse to negotiate with regard to permissive subjects).
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An unfair labor charge can be brought when one party refuses to bargain in 
good faith over a mandatory subject.30 The good faith requirement to bargain 
collectively, however, does not indicate a necessity for parties to reach an 
agreement.31 The “good faith” requirement in collective bargaining is focused 
on the standards of behavior in the bargaining process, not on results.32  
A theory of judicial non-intervention supports the purpose of the NLRB 
refereeing the collective bargaining process.33 While the Act establishes the 
right of employees to join labor organizations and engage in collective action, 
it also guarantees the right of employees to abstain from forming or joining a 
labor union.34 Additionally, the Act provides a strict procedure for decertifying 
a labor organization by a vote of the union’s members.35 Following a petition to 
the NLRB for decertifi cation signed by at least thirty percent of the employees, 
the Board takes a secret ballot poll of the entire bargaining unit to determine 
whether or not to decertify the unit.36 If the majority of employees vote against 
the continuation of the union as the exclusive representative of the bargaining 
unit, the Board then decertifi es the union.37 
 B. The Labor Exemption
Because the union-employer relationship can often lead to accusations of 
antitrust violations, courts have recognized a “non-statutory labor exemption” 
from antitrust law in certain agreements reached in the course of collective 
30.  See § 158(a)(5) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse 
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees [over mandatory subjects 
of bargaining].”).
31.  See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (“While Congress did 
not compel agreement between employers and bargaining representatives, it did require 
collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result.”); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 
311 U.S. 514, 525 (1941) (“It is true that the National Labor Relations Act, while requiring 
the employer to bargain collectively, does not compel him to enter into an agreement.”). 
32.  Cf. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1967) (stressing that the 
employer has an obligation to supply all relevant information necessary for the employees’ 
bargaining representative to perform its duties); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) 
(holding that the duty “may be violated without a general failure of subjective good faith”). 
33.  See generally Lock, supra note 23, at 381–83 (explaining the theory behind 
restraint in judicial intervention during the bargaining process as being consistent with 
congressional intent manifested in the text of the Act).
34.  See § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to 
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment . . . .”).
35.  See § 159(c)(1) (requiring an initial petition by employees); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 
102.83–102.84 (2010) (regulating the form, content, and procedure for presentation to the 
NLRB of  decertifi cation petitions).
36.  § 159(e)(1).
37.  Id. 
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bargaining under the NLRA.38 The primary purpose of the labor exemption 
is to protect labor organizations and their bargaining activities.39 Typically, 
antitrust actions are brought under the Sherman Act, which condemns “[e]
very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce.”40 The Supreme Court has held, however, 
that parties engaged in labor agreements can be immune from antitrust laws.41 
The Court cited a “strong labor policy” favoring labor agreements, even in the 
face of antitrust restraints.42 The labor exemption and antitrust immunity apply 
when agreements at issue relate to mandatory subjects of bargaining such as 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.43  
C. The NLRA and Collective Bargaining as Applied to the Sports Industry
In 1969 the Board established its jurisdiction over professional sports leagues, 
holding in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs44 that Congress 
38.  See Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfi tters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 
622 (1975) (recognizing “the nonstatutory exemption” to federal antitrust law protects the 
unions ability to “eliminate competition over wages and working competitions” and to 
inevitably “affect price competition among employers”); Local No. 189, Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965) 
(“[T]he national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond 
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, 
employees must work.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (“The labor of a human being 
is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall 
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or 
conducted for profi t, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations 
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, 
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (preventing 
federal courts from enjoining activity that would otherwise be considered “an unlawful 
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of [certain] acts” in the context 
of a labor dispute).
39.  See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229–33 (1941) (holding 
that labor actions directed at an employer but due to “internecine” confl ict between two 
competing labor organizations did not violate the antitrust law); but cf. Allen Bradley Co. 
v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 807–11 (1945) (noting, 
however, that the exemption does not permit unions to combine with non-labor groups in 
order “to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services”). 
40.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
41.  See 312 U.S. at 229–33 (explaining that “whether trade union conduct constitutes 
a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and 
[Section] 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of 
outlawry of labor conduct”). 
42.  See 421 U.S. at 622 (“[T]he goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if 
this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.”). 
43.  See id. (“The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy 
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working 
conditions.”).
44.  Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Ass’n of Nat’l Baseball League Umpires, 
180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
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intended for the Act to apply to Major League Baseball.45 And   reasoned 
that, based on its policy of encouraging collective bargaining, it should assert 
its jurisdiction and subject any professional team sports labor dispute to the 
Act.46 For the fi rst time, the Board accepted the idea that professional baseball 
affects interstate commerce, and thus ruled that professional baseball is subject 
to the Act.47 The Supreme Court applied the Board’s holding in Radovich v. 
Nat’l Football League to determine that both football48 and basketball49 affect 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and are, by extension, subject 
to the NLRA. 
 Then, in 1980 the Fifth Circuit established that when facing a joint 
employer relationship, such as a professional sports league, a league-wide, 
multi-employer bargaining unit was appropriate because the unit had “common 
labor problems and a high degree of centralized control over labor relations.”50 
And rationalized that only a bargaining unit comprised of every league player 
can wield enough bargaining power to challenge professional sports leagues.51 
 For multi–employer certifi cation, the NLRB requires either such a joint 
agreement between the parties or a controlling history of bargaining on a 
45.  See id. at 192 (“We can fi nd, neither in the statute nor in its legislative history, any 
expression of a Congressional intent that disputes between employers and employees in 
[the] industry [of professional sports] should be removed from the scheme of the National 
Labor Relations Act.”).
46.  See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORT § 6.03, at 788 
(1979) (explaining that the Act is broad enough to permit the Board to exercise jurisdiction 
over “all the employees” in professional team sports, “from bat boys to maintenance men”). 
47.  See id. at 190–91 (“Congressional deliberations regarding the relationship 
of baseball and other professional team sports to the antitrust laws likewise refl ect a 
Congressional assumption that such sports are subject to regulation under the commerce 
clause . . . [and] legal scholars have agreed . . . that professional sports are in or affect 
interstate commerce, and as such are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  See generally NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (establishing that that 
the Board had authority under the NLRA to exert jurisdiction over an employer even when 
a manufacturer was not directly involved in interstate commerce but instead, received and 
shipped a small volume of manufactured goods through interstate commerce). 
48. Cf. Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (“[T]he volume 
of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within the 
provisions of the [Sherman] Act.”).
49. Cf. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 
1971) (“The business of professional basketball as conducted by NBA and the NBA teams 
on a multi-state basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise and broadcast the games for 
interstate transmission, is trade or commerce among the several States within the meaning 
of the Sherman Act.”), stay granted, 1971 WL3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971), reinstated sub 
nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204.
50. 613 F.2d 1379, 1383  (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that once a player is hired by 
a team, his working conditions are controlled not only by that team, but by the league as 
well). 
51. Cf.  PAUL C. WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 302–03 (3d ed. 
2004) (explaining that multi-employer bargaining is now a common feature, because “[b]
oth employers and unions in these industries fi nd they have a complimentary long-term 
interest in putting their relationship on that broader footing”); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra 
note 46, at 794 (“Multi-employer bargaining is presently used in professional sports . . . 
.”); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 530 (describing that today “players associations have 
become a powerful tool” in collective bargaining).  
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multi-employer basis.52 In the sports industry, the inclusion of all teams within 
a league, along with the league commissioner’s offi ce, constitutes a multi-
employer unit for collective bargaining.53
In the context of a multi–employer unit, challenges often arise over the 
issues of individual bargaining and the union’s right to fair representation.54 
Professional sports contracts have historically been made between a player and 
a single team or organization. Meanwhile, the relevant collective bargaining 
agreement does not set salaries for contracts, but rather contains constraints 
concerning wages and conditions of employment within which players and 
teams are free to negotiate.55 Each league sets forth in its CBA the limitations 
or parameters in which a player and team can negotiate a salary, but no matter 
the system, any employer that individually bargains with a player outside of 
those parameters is committing an unfair labor practice.56
The Supreme Court’s standard for such action comes from J.I. Case Co. 
v. NLRB,57 when the Court conceded that in some situations, allowing for 
individual employees to bargain may be benefi cial for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.58 The Southern District of New York’s decision in Morio v. North 
American Soccer League59 best illustrates the issue of individual bargaining 
in sports.60 The Morio court granted a temporary injunction on all individual 
contracts due to a violation of the employers’ duty to bargain exclusively with 
the bargaining representatives of the players.61 Thus, in sports there is more 
individual freedom of contract for employees under typical league collective 
bargaining agreements, so long as the employees and the individual teams act 
52.  Id.
53.  See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that there is a joint employer relationship between the North American Soccer 
League and the various clubs that have a “proportionate role in League management”). 
54.  See generally NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 94–97 (1957) 
(establishing the constitutionality of multi-employer bargaining).
55.  See WONG, supra note 5 at 529–30 (explaining the difference between typical 
sports contracts and those of other unions such as butchers, teachers, or grocery workers 
who will negotiate specifi c salaries in collective bargaining). 
56.  Compare WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 305 (quoting Morio v. N. Am. 
Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 
1980) (explaining that any individual bargaining outside of a CBA can be a violation under 
the Act, because a union is entitled to conduct all bargaining with an employer), with 
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 808 (describing how it has “been common for 
collective bargaining agreements in professional sports to cover only the minimum terms . 
. . and to specifi cally provide that individual athletes may negotiate individually for better 
terms” (emphasis added)). 
57.  321 U.S. 332 (1944).
58.  See id. at 338 (noting that it may be wise for a CBA to set basic terms but to allow 
further individualized bargaining, particularly when individual employees face different 
work or personal circumstances).
59.  501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
60.  See id. at 635, 637 (fi nding that the soccer league’s clubs continued to negotiate 
with individual players after the NLRB named the league as a multi-employer unit).
61.  See id. at 638–39, 640 (“The duty to bargain carries with it the obligation on the 
part of the employer not to undercut the Union by entering into individual contracts with 
the employees.”).
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in good faith and within the parameters of the CBA.62
The duty to bargain in good faith is best seen through the behaviors and 
actions of parties involved in collective bargaining.63 In sports, bad faith 
bargaining accusations are usually the result of one party refusing to start or 
continue negotiations with the other party.64 Both players associations and 
leagues have been found guilty of unfair labor practices for a bad faith refusal 
to negotiate over mandatory subjects of bargaining.65   
While the Act vaguely mandates that all negotiations must be in good faith 
“with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,”66 
several cases have explicitly held certain types of restraints and parameters 
within collective bargaining to be mandatory subjects of bargaining in good 
faith.67 Some of the most important bargaining issues are included in mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining, such as free agency,68
62.  See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 307 (discussing the free market 
orientation of CBAs in sports and how such an orientation is different “than what one fi nds 
in most unionized sectors.”).
63.  See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text. 
64.  See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (explaining that bad faith has 
een found when there was a refusal to negotiate or an attempt to bypass the other party with 
a unilateral change in a mandatory subject matter of collective bargaining). 
65.  Compare Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (“[B]y unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule providing for an 
automatic fi ne to be levied against any player who leaves the bench area while a fi ght or 
an altercation is in progress on the football fi eld, [employers] have engaged in unfair labor 
practices.”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 & n.217.1 (explaining that 
in 1976 the NBPA was found to have bargained in bad faith when it refused to bargain over 
player restraint mechanisms that were mandatory subjects of bargaining, but which the 
NBPA contended were violations of antitrust law). 
66.  29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
67.  Accord Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Powell 
v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell II”), 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player 
Relations Comm., Inc. (“Silverman II”), 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 
1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
68.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (holding that the “Rozelle Rule,” which provides 
guidelines on free agency for NFL players, constitutes a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining). 
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player mobility restraints69 (including compensation systems),70 salary caps, 
player drafts,71 and salary arbitration.72  
Challenges to mandatory subjects of bargaining in sports have often been 
presented as antitrust claims under Sherman Act.73 These challenges are 
typically defended by the non-statutory labor exemption that allows for a 
league to engage in behavior that would otherwise be an antitrust violation, 
so long as the action or restriction relates to mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining.74 Mackey v. National Football League provides the accepted 
requirements with which a subject of collective bargaining in sports may be 
exempt from trade restraints claims.75 The Eighth Circuit designated a three-
part test to determine whether the restraint receives the labor exemption.76 For 
the labor exemption to apply, (1) the restraint on trade must primarily affect 
only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the agreement must 
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement 
must be the product of bona fi de arm’s-length bargaining.77  
69.  See id. (noting that the Rozelle Rule “operates to restrict a player’s ability to 
move from one team to another and depresses player salaries”).
70.  See Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303 (“The First Refusal/Compensation system, a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, was twice set forth in collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated in good faith . . . .”). 
71.  See, e.g., Wood, 809 F.2d at 961–62 (holding that the salary cap, entry draft, 
minimum individual salaries, fringe benefi ts, minimum aggregate team salaries, guaranteed 
revenue sharing, and fi rst refusal provisions, “are mandatory subjects of bargaining . . . 
[because] [e]ach of them clearly is intimately related to ‘wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment’”).
72.  See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 
880 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (fi nding that the 
“salary arbitration for reserve players is also a mandatory part of the collective bargaining 
process between the Players and the Owners.”).
73.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d 606, 609, 610 (challenging an NFL rule that allowed the 
league commissioner to force a club receiving a free agent to compensate the player’s former 
club); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (reciting contentions by 
a national basketball player that “[a] ‘salary cap,’ college draft, and prohibition of player 
corporations violated Sherman Act”).
74.  See supra Part II.B; see also Local Union No. 189 v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 
Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (holding 
that a marketing-hours restriction was related to wages and hours, and obtained through 
collective bargaining, and thus fell within the “protection of the national labor policy and 
[was] therefore exempt from the Sherman Act”). 
75.  Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
76.  Id.
77.  Id.
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III.  HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN THE  NFL AND THE NBA
Both the NBA and the NFL have exclusive bargaining agents that were fi rst 
recognized in the 1960’s—the NFLPA and the NBPA.78 During their tenure, 
both labor organizations have negotiated numerous collective bargaining 
agreements with their respective leagues, yet both the NFL and the NBA 
have had their share of strikes, work stoppages and even cancelled seasons.79 
Currently after a four-and-half month lockout, the 2011 NFL season is back 
on track, after a new ten-year CBA was executed on July 21, 2011. 80 But, the 
NBA’s 2011 season appears to be in jeopardy after the league and the NBPA’s 
negotiations failed on July 1, 2011 the NBA fi led an unfair labor practice 
complaint with the NLRB and a suit against the NBPA in Federal District 
Court of New York.81 
A. Labor History of the National Football League
The NFLPA was formed in 1956 and became the exclusive bargaining unit 
to NFL players in 1968.82 While there were small work stoppages in 1968, 
1970, and 197483 the NFLPA encountered its fi rst serious issue in the case of 
Mackey v. National Football League.84
In Mackey, a group of present and former players sued the NFL, arguing that 
the “Rozelle Rule,” was an unfair restraint on trade under the Sherman Act.85 
This rule provided that, upon the expiration of a player’s original team contract, 
if a player switched teams and the two teams could not reach a satisfactory
78. Compare About the NBPA, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.
nbpa.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (explaining that the National Basketball 
Players Association was founded in 1954), and WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (stating that 
the National Football League Players Association was founded in 1956), with Mackey 
v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976) (pointing out that the NLRB 
recognized the NFLPA in 1968 as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL 
players), and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (“Williams II”), 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 
1995) (referencing how the NBA and NBPA entered into their fi rst collective bargaining 
agreement in 1967).
79.  See April Weiner, NFL and the CBA: Ranking the Worst Work Stoppages in 
Pro Sports’ History, BLEACHER REPORT (March 10, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/631338-nfl -and-the-cba-ranking-the-worst-work-stoppages-in-pro-sports-history 
(noting that the NFL has had fi ve work stoppages since its inception—four strikes and one 
lockout—and the NBA has had three work stoppages, all of which were lockouts).
80.  See DeMaurice Smith, Interview with Michel Martin host of NPR’s Tell Me 
More (July 27, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/27/138738431/
nfl s-longest-work-stoppage-ends).
81.  See Nathan Koppel, NBA Takes Players Association to Court, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL LAW BLOG (August 2, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/02/
nba-takes-players-association-to-court/?mod=WSJBlog; Nat’l Basketball League, NBA 
Files Unfair Labor Practice Charge, Lawsuit Against NBPA (August 2, 2011 10:38 AM), 
http://www.nba.com/2011/news/08/02/nba-labor-lawsuit/. 
82.  Kapp v. Nat’l Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 83 (N.D. Cal. 1974), vacated in 
part, No. 72-537, 1975 WL 959 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1975), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 
1978).
83.  WONG, supra note 5, at 544 tbl.11.3.
84.  543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
85.  Id. at 609. 
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arrangement on compensation, the league commissioner could transfer 
substitute players from the player’s new team to the old team.86 League players 
complained that the rule limited their free agency and argued that they could not 
freely contract out their services.87  The NFL argued that it was shielded from 
antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor exemption within the Sherman 
Act, due to its participation in a CBA.88  The District Court of Minnesota held 
that “[the NFL’s] enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted 
refusal to deal . . . and therefore was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”89
The Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling that because the Rozelle 
Rule was not the product of “bona-fi de arms length bargaining,” the labor 
exemption did not apply and the Rozelle Rule was subject to antitrust scrutiny 
under the Sherman Act.90 In a victory for the players, the court held that the 
Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law because it was an unreasonable 
restraint on trade, but the court also encouraged the two sides to resolve the 
issue of player mobility restraints through a collective bargaining agreement.91 
The two sides came to an agreement in March of 1977 that contained league 
concessions on “union security” and the league’s pension plans, in return for 
new and different restrictions on free agency.92
Then, in 1982 following the expiration of the CBA, the NFL players went 
on strike; this strike lasted fi fty-seven days and ended with a new agreement.93 
Later, in 1987, the NFL experienced its most signifi cant labor dispute after 
the expiration of the 1982 CBA when the NFL owners found replacements for 
the striking players and the NBPA was forced to call off the strike after many 
players were close to crossing the picket line to receive a paycheck.94 After 
twenty–four days the strike ended, and the players returned to work under 
similar pre-strike conditions.95
86.  Id. at 610–11.  
87.  Id. at 609.
88. Id at 620–21.
89.  Id. at 609 (citing Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 
.1975)).
90.  See id. at 616 (observing that the clubs had unilaterally imposed the rule since 
1963).  See generally John Croke, An Examination of the Antitrust Issues Surrounding the 
NBA Decertifi cation Crisis, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 163, 177-79 (1998) (discussing the “per se” 
and “rule of reason” antitrust analyses in the decertifi cation context). 
91.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (“The parties are far better situated to agreeably 
resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than 
are the courts.”). 
92. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 231 (observing that the new rules 
“proved even more restrictive than the old Rozelle Rule” and that only one player “actually 
changed teams for compensation” from 1977 to 1987). 
93.  See WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (noting that the union conceded on the issue of 
player mobility in return for better player salaries and benefi ts).
94.  See generally Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike of 1987: The Question of 
Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (1988) (explaining the disputes over free agency 
and player mobility in the 1987 strike). See id. at 29 (describing how two-thirds of the 
league teams found replacement players, while the striking players, on the other hand, had 
limited fi nancial reserves and the union had no “strike fund” prepared).
95.  See id. at 30 (stating that the strike ended October 15th).
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The fi ght was not over, and a group of players brought suit against the NFL 
in the District Court of Minnesota for several restrictions contained in the 
CBA and in the standard player contract—claiming that they were violations 
of the Sherman Act.96 The court refused to order a preliminary injunction on 
the issues and held that the labor exemption protected the NFL—as the parties 
had not come yet to an impasse.97  
The players appealed the district court’s decision that there was not yet 
an impasse, but the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and 
held that the labor exemption applies for “as long as there is a possibility that 
proceedings may be commenced before the Board, or until fi nal resolution of 
Board proceedings and appeals.”98 Noting, in the decision, that antitrust claims 
were not appropriate because labor policy favors “negotiated settlements 
rather than intervention by courts.”99   
Following this ruling, and having played two seasons without a CBA in 
place, the NFLPA elected to decertify itself as the exclusive bargaining unit 
through a league-wide player vote.100 Following decertifi cation, another lawsuit 
was fi led against the NFL in Powell v. National Football League & McNeil 
v. National Football League (Powell III).101 The District Court of Minnesota 
held that because of the decertifi cation of the NFLPA, the labor exemption no 
longer protected the NFL and the player restraints challenged in the suit were
96.  See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell I”), 678 F. Supp. 777, 778–79 (D. 
Minn. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs “[sought] to enjoin defendants from implementing or 
continuing a system of alleged player restraints [set up to restrict player mobility]”), rev’d, 
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
97.  See id. at 788 (“[P]roper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires 
that a labor exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration 
of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that issue; 
thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from scrutiny . . . .”) The NLRB 
has ruled an “impasse” to be a “matter of judgment” in which the Board considers: 
[the] bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the 
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to to [sic] which there is disagreement, 
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations . . . . See   
Taft Broad. Co. & Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967); 
see also Wong, supra note 5, at 544 (listing seven factors to consider).
98.  See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (Powell II), 930 F.2d 1293, 1303–04 (8th Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements conceived in an ongoing 
collective bargaining relationship . . . beyond impasse. . . . ”)
99.  Id. at 1303.
100.  See WONG, supra note 6, at 531. Without a CBA, the league was able to institute 
unilateral changes so long as the bargaining relationship existed, and these changes could 
not be challenged as unfair labor practices through NLRB jurisdiction. 
101.  764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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now vulnerable to antitrust violation claims.102 This time, a jury found that the 
NFL’s compensation rule was a violation of the Sherman Act.103  
Another suit was fi led less than two weeks after Powell: White v. National 
Football League.104 In White a group of players brought a class action suit 
seeking total or modifi ed free agency.105 White eventually settled out of court, 
and the NFL paid $195 million to the class of players and granted greater free 
agency to the NFL players.106 Not long after the Powell verdict, the players 
once again elected the NFLPA as their exclusive bargaining representative and 
the NFLPA successfully executed a new CBA in 1993.107
The most recent CBA, signed in 2006, included a provision allowing 
owners to opt out of the agreement in March, 2011—instead of its expiration 
in 2012.108 Months before the CBA actually expired, NFLPA executive director 
DeMaurice Smith expressed concerns about the NFL making plans for a 
lockout,109 and stated that every team had taken individual votes to determine 
whether the NFLPA should once again decertify as the exclusive bargaining 
unit.110
On March 11, 2011, the owners opted out of the agreement and the league
locked out its players.111 The same day, the NFLPA offi cially 
decertifi ed and a group of individual players fi led a lawsuit in
102.  See id. at 1358–59 (reasoning that, without a certifi ed collective bargaining 
representative, no further remedy or action before the Board remained, and thus there was 
no longer the “ongoing collective bargaining relationship”).
103.  See McDonough, supra note 6, at 840 (describing how the jury found that Plan 
B had “a substantially harmful effect on competition” and caused economic injury to the 
players (quoting Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 n.2 (D. Minn. 
1992))).
104.  White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993), motion 
for fi nal approval of settlement granted, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 
402 (8th Cir. 1994).
105.  Id. at 1394–95.
106.  McDonough, supra note 6, at 842 (“But of greater importance is that the White 
settlement, gained only after decertifi cation of the players own union and subsequent court 
victories, provided the most signifi cant amount of free agency in the history of the NFL.”).
107.  WONG, supra note 5, at 531.
108.  See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006–2012 (Mar. 8, 2006) (unpublished 
contract) (on fi le with author); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 546 (explaining that the “[o]
wners unanimously vote[d] to opt out of [the] collective bargaining agreement” on May 
20, 2008, an act that resulted in the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement 
moving to May 1, 2011).
109.  See Associated Press, Union Head Says Owners Set for Lockout, ESPN (Oct. 
5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl /news/story?id=5652700 (explaining that Smith has 
pointed to the NFL’s recently asking banks to extend loan periods for league teams in the 
event of a lockout).
110.  See Doug Farrar, Players, NFL Dig In For Pending Labor Fight, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(Nov. 18, 2010) http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl /news?slug=ys-nfl labor111810/ (describing the 
actions of the league and the NFLPA in preparing for a possible lockout at the end of the 
current season).
111.  See Nate Davis, NFLPA Decertifi es, Pursues Lockout Injunction Against NFL, 
USA TODAY, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/03/report-nfl -
players-association-applies-for-decertifi cation/1 (Mar. 12, 2011).
362          THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM       [Vol. 1:3
U.S. District Court, alleging antitrust violations and seeking an 
injunction regarding the lockout.112 In the months since then, the 
NFLPA has engaged in a series of court hearings, court-mandated mediation and 
numerous negotiation meetings.113 Then, on July 25, 2011 NFL Commissioners 
Roger Goodell and DeMaurice Smith announced that the league and the 
NFLPA had reached a new ten-year CBA which would end the lockout and 
that “[f]ootball [was] back.”114
B. Labor History of the National Basketball Association
The exclusive bargaining unit of the NBA is the NBPA, which was founded 
in 1954.115 The NBA entered into its fi rst CBA in 1967.116 Following the 1971 
decision in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,117 which provided 
that the NBA participated in interstate commerce,118 and thus, by extension, 
would fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.119 
Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n120 provided a major victory for the league in 
the labor relationship. Leon Wood, a college basketball player drafted in the 
fi rst round of the NBA draft, brought suit against the league and argued that 
the draft and salary cap were illegal restraints of trade.121 Despite fi nding that 
the draft and salary cap actually injured Wood and others in the position of 
drafted players, the Wood court held that all trade restraints were the product of 
collective bargaining and thus could not be challenged on antitrust grounds.122
112.  See id. 
113. See generally Sal Paolantonio, Players, Owners Facing Tight Squeeze, ESPN.
COM (July 11, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl /columns/story?columnist=paolantonio_
sal&id=6756795 (describing the federal judge-mandated negotiations between the league 
and NFL player representatives). 
114. See Players Vote to Approve New Labor Deal, Put End to Extended Lockout, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2011 9:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
football/nfl /07/25/nfl -labor-deal.ap/index.html.
115.  See About the NBPA, supra note 78 (discussing how the NBA recognized the 
NBPA as the exclusive union representative of all NBA players when the players threatened 
not to play in the fi rst televised All-Stars game).
116.  Id.
117.  325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay granted, 1971 WL 3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 
16, 1971), reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
118.  See id. at 1062 (noting that the NBA operates in seventeen metropolitan areas, 
schedules games in numerous states, and receives revenue from nationwide broadcasts).
119.  See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
120.  809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
121.  Id. at 956–57.
122.  Id. at 959, 960 (rebuffi ng a basketball player’s argument that his superior skills 
vis-à-vis other players should permit him to insist on individual bargaining, because 
“collective agreements routinely set standard wages for employees with differing 
responsibilities, skills, and levels of effi ciency”); see McDonough supra note 6, at 833–34 
(highlighting the fact that Wood still lost the suit even though at the time he was not yet a 
part of the bargaining unit but an in-coming college athlete, and explaining that the court 
relied on the defi nition of “employee” in the NLRA in holding against Wood). 
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Besides the Wood decision, the fi rst major labor issue in the NBA arose 
in 1995.123 Facing the imminent expiration of the CBA in 1994, the league
and players managed to reach a no-strike, no-lockout agreement to protect 
the 1994–95 season; the players played under the regulations of the previous 
agreement in hopes of striking a new deal during the season.124 However, 
following the expiration of the CBA on June 23, 1994 the NBA and its teams 
brought suit against the class of present and future NBA players seeking a 
judgment stipulating:
(i) that the continued imposition of the disputed provisions of the CBA 
[the college draft, the salary cap, and the right of fi rst refusal for free 
agents] would not violate the antitrust laws because that imposition is 
“governed solely by the labor laws and is exempt from antitrust liability 
under the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws”; and (ii) that 
the disputed provisions are lawful even if the antitrust laws apply.125 
The Second Circuit ruled for the league and cited the labor exemption as 
providing the league with immunity from possible antitrust challenges so long 
as there was a collective bargaining relationship between the parties.126
After the 1995 season, the loss in Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams 
(“Williams I”), and the failure to negotiate a new CBA, a group of NBA 
players who were unhappy with the current league provisions signed a petition 
to decertify the players association as their exclusive bargaining agent.127 The 
association’s biggest stars, led by Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing, also 
brought an antitrust suit in District Court.128 Eventually, the NLRB conducted
123.  See WONG, supra note 5, at 549 tbl.11.3 (noting that in 1995, the NBPA threatened 
to decertify during an owners’ lockout).
124.  Robert Bradley,  Labor Pains Nothing New to NBA, ASS’N FOR PROF’L 
BASKETBALL RES., http://www.apbr.org/labor.html (last visited May 30, 2010).
125.  See Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (fi nding that the players had 
refused to negotiate with the NBA until the 1988 CBA had expired); see also McDonough, 
supra note 6, at 835 (indicating that the same restrictions had been challenged eight years 
prior in Wood).
126.  See 45 F.3d at 691, 693 (holding that even after the expiration of a collective 
bargaining agreement, where there is a collective bargaining relationship employers can 
still bargain with a union, implement joint proposals, and use economic pressure to secure 
agreement on proposals). 
127.  See 1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND 
BUSINESS 95 (1997) (describing the 1995 negotiations and the resulting attempt to get rid 
of the union leadership).
128.  See id. (stating that the lawsuit alleged that any joint action by the NBA owners, 
whether a lockout, the return of the old salary cap system, or a new system, “would violate 
the antitrust laws in the absence of a union”).
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an election that would determine whether the players association would 
be decertifi ed.129 By a vote of 226–134 the union remained the exclusive 
bargaining agent.130 Still without a CBA, the NBPA and the league continued to 
negotiate and eventually created a new agreement in July 1996, all without any 
signifi cant work stoppages—either by a player strike or an owner lockout.131 
The new six–year CBA, however, contained a provision allowing owners to 
re–open negotiations after three years if player salaries rose too high relative 
to league income, and in 1998, the NBA faced a work stoppage.132 During the 
season, on March 23, 1998, the owners voted to reopen negotiations, and, after 
nine negotiation sessions that produced little progress, the league announced 
a lockout beginning July 1, 1998.133 The lockout lasted six months, and right 
before the 1998–1999 season was set to be cancelled, the sides settled on a 
new CBA and agreed to play a shortened season beginning in February.134 Both 
sides made concessions in the settlement, with the players suffering a new cap 
on individual salaries, while the owners lost in their efforts to institute a hard 
team salary cap.135
The most recent CBA came into existence on July 1, 2005 and expired on 
June 30, 2011.136 The owners made the decision to refuse an option to continue 
the CBA until 2012, and the struggles in negotiation over the past six months 
have resulted in both sides questioning whether there will be an NBA season 
in 2011.137 Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the NBPA fi led an unfair labor 
charge against the league with the Board for unfair bargaining practices,
129.  Id.; see Murray Chass, N.B.A. Taking a Timeout for Decertifi cation Results, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at B12 (“If the union wins, the players will continue to have a labor 
relationship with the N.B.A., short-circuiting an antitrust suit . . . [if] the NLRB certifi es 
the results, Judge David Doty of United States District Court in Minneapolis will consider 
the players’ request to issue a preliminary injunction ending the league’s lockout of the 
players.”).
130.  David Steele, NBA Players Vote for Union Decertifi cation Fails; Lockout Could 
End Friday, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 13, 1995, at B1. 
131.  See WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95–96 (describing the tumultuous 
relationship between the owners and union following the decertifi cation election).
132. Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball: The Lockout of 1998-99, 122 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter, Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball].
133.  Id. at 4–5 (explaining that the league claimed nearly half of its 29 teams were 
losing money, and that players were receiving 57 percent of total revenue in salaries, a 
number much greater than the threshold 51.8% that allowed owners to reopen negotiations). 
134.  Id. at 8.
135.  Id.
136.  2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XXXIX (unpublished 
contract) (on fi le with author), available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005.
137.  See Coon, supra note 3 (“If the league and players’ union don’t come to terms 
on a new agreement by then, the league will impose a lockout, a work stoppage that will 
disrupt business and could possibly lead to the cancellation of the entire 2011-12 season.”); 
see also Chris Mannix, As Two Sides Stand Firm, Lockout Seems Inevitable For NBA, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 12, 2010), http:// sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/chris_ 
mannix/07/12/stern.las.vegas/ (noting that the league’s current proposal and the players’ 
current proposal are “miles apart”).
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complaining the NBA’s goal was to avoid meaningful negotiation until a 
lockout was in place.138 Following the expiration of the CBA, the owners 
initiated a lockout,139 and the biggest issue the two sides are in disagreement 
about is revenue sharing between owners and players.140 NBA commissioner 
David Stern and NBPA executive director Billy Hunter have met for several 
negotiations, but since expiration, progress has stalled and both sides appear 
unafraid to discuss the possibility of a lengthy work stoppage.141  
IV.  ANALYSIS OF NLRB DECERTIFICATION AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS
While the NFL players have decertifi ed their union once before, both the 
NFLPA and NBPA considered the option of Board–regulated decertifi cation in 
light of the threat of a lockout in 2011.142 However, decertifi cation of a union 
provides instability and it is unlikely to result in any large benefi ts—in contrast 
to the advantages of continued negotiation through an exclusive bargaining 
agent certifi ed by the Board.
A. Legal Options of a Decertifi ed Players’ Association to 
Challenge Trade Restraints 
The Eighth Circuit established that any trade restraint is a mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining. Yet, today almost all salary caps, free agency 
restrictions, and rookie drafts fall under the labor exemption—so long as a 
collective bargaining relationship exists.143 Thus, a players’ association who 
desires to pursue an antitrust claim against a league is presented with a many 
number of options under the Sherman Act.
In Powell II, the court lists several choices for labor organizations faced 
with possible restraints on trade, including exerting economic pressure and 
presenting claims to the Board.144 Additionally, in Williams I, Judge Duffy 
opined that the players union could decertify under Board regulations and 
subsequently bring antitrust claims against the NBA, but did not advise the 
players to pursue this course of action.145  As the Eighth Circuit explained:
138. See ESPN.COM, supra note 4. 
139.  See id. 
140.  See Coon, supra note 3 (“The players are guaranteed fi fty-seven percent of the 
league’s revenues  . . . before expenses come out.”).
141.  See Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Lockout Threatens Entire Season, YAHOO SPORTS, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_lockout_players_063011 
(June 30, 2011) (“[T]here’s a real chance the NBA is gone for a full year now. This has the 
makings of the NHL’s labor war of 2004-05, where the cost of instituting a hard salary cap 
cost the sport a complete season.”).
142.  See generally Coon, supra note 3 (noting that “fewer than ten percent of the 
players who experienced the lockout in 1998-99 are still in the league”).
143.  See Powell II, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the labor exemption 
protects “agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship . . .” from 
antitrust liability). See also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“impasse” and “bargaining relationship” tests).
144.  See id. 
145.  See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (Williams I), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
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[W]e are not compelled to look into the future and pick a 
termination point for the labor exemption. The parties are now faced 
with several choices. They may bargain further . . . [t]hey may resort 
to economic force. And fi nally, if appropriate issues arise, they may 
present claims to the [Board]. We are satisfi ed that as long as there is 
a possibility that proceedings may be commenced before the Board, 
or until fi nal resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom, 
the labor relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.146
A decertifi ed labor organization holds almost no actual power; instead, the 
power to bring legal action lies in the hands of individual employees.147 Not 
only will the players have to provide their own legal representation— instead of 
relying on the union to bring suit or an unfair labor practices complaint against 
the league—but the chances of winning such lawsuits are not a certainty for 
the players.148  
This theory is exemplifi ed by Caldwell—where a player in the American 
Basketball Association brought suit against the league and his team for a 
suspension.149 The court ruled, however, that because the American Basketball 
Association Players Association had received Board certifi cation as the 
exclusive bargaining unit, Caldwell’s proper pursuit of a claim was through 
the NLRB by alleging unfair labor practices, rather than an antitrust suit.150 
More recently a group of NBA players lost their antitrust counterclaims in 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams.151 In dicta, the  court reasoned that there was 
no per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore considered 
the reasonableness of the challenged restraints.152 Applying a “rule of reason” 
analysis, the Williams court reasoned that the salary cap, the restrictions on 
free agency, and the college draft were not anti–competitive.153
146. Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303.
147.  See Croke, supra note 90 at 177 (warning that decertifi cation would leave the 
individual players to “fend for themselves”).
148.  Compare Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(holding that the Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law), with Williams I, 857 F. 
Supp. 1069, 1078–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding on exemption grounds but positing in 
dicta that the challenged trade restraints were not violations of antitrust law), aff’d, 45 F.3d 
684 (2d Cir. 1995).
149.  See id. at 526 (explaining that Caldwell alleged that the team and league conspired 
to “blacklist” him to ensure that he could never play in the league again).
150. See id. at 530 (“[I]f Caldwell is allowed to proceed with the present action, 
employees in similar circumstances will either never resort to the NLRB or will 
institute parallel administrative and antitrust proceedings with the risk of inconsistent 
adjudications.”).
151.  See Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1071, 1078, 1079 (characterizing professional 
athletic associations as joint ventures, not as “competitors in any economic sense” 
(quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis in 
original))).
152.  Id. at 1078–79.
153.  See id. at 1079 (“The pro-competitive effects of these practices, in particular the 
maintenance of competitive balance, may outweigh their restrictive consequences.”). 
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Most recently, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brady v. NFL154 may be 
interpreted by other circuits as holding that lockouts are legal, even in the 
face of decertifi ed unions.155 This decision could greatly impact the strongest 
weapon of decertifi ed unions, the assurance that decertifi ed unions can bring 
antitrust claims against a league instituting a lockout. Even if such reading of 
the June 8, 2011 decision is a stretch of the imagination, the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion solidifi es the notion that lockouts cannot be enjoined, and as such, 
any lockout would remain in place until the merits of the case are heard.156 For 
example, the Brady case would not have been heard by a U.S. District Court 
until 2012, thus ensuring that without a negotiated deal, the NFL could have 
cancelled the upcoming season, despite whether or not the NFLPA elected to 
decertify. 
Thus, continuing the union as the certifi ed exclusive bargaining unit under the 
oversight of the NLRB is a more stable option in furthering the players’ efforts 
to affect change in league provisions, as union lawsuits and unfair labor practice 
claims are less expensive and will be possibly more successful than individual 
antitrust lawsuits brought by players outside of the union.   
 Finally, there exists the possibility of NBA or NFL owners bringing a bad 
faith bargaining charge against their respective players’ association concerning 
the decision to decertify.157 Looking at the current status of the NFL, with every 
team voting—most unanimously—for decertifi cation more than four months 
before the current CBA expires,158 the league could argue that the players had 
no desire to reach an agreement.159 By decertifying immediately following the 
CBA expiration, the NFL and the NBA players would be placing themselves in 
a different situation from the 1989 NFLPA, which only decertifi ed following a 
failed court challenge and two seasons of play without an agreement in place.160 
154.  Brady v. Nat’l Football League, Docket No. 11-1898 (8th Cir. 2011).
155 See Michael McCann, Burning Questions From Eighth Circuit Ruling To Extend 
NFL Lockout, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 16, 2011) http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
writers/michael_mccann/05/16/nfl .lockout/index.html. 
156 See Brady (“[W]e conclude that § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives a 
federal court of power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from 
implementing a lockout of its employees.”). 
157.  Cf. HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 803 (explaining that the Board can fi nd bad 
faith even if a party is willing to meet, so long as the Bard fi nds that the party “is merely 
going through the motions of bargaining”).
158.  See supra note 110.
159.  See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) 
(holding that the duty of good faith is an obligation “to participate actively . . . as to indicate 
a present intention to fi nd a basis for agreement . . . ‘[with] an open mind and sincere desire 
to reach an agreement’” (quoting NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st 
Cir. 1941)).
160.  See generally WONG, supra note 5 at 544–45 & tbl.11.3 (describing the history of 
the 1989 NFLPA decertifi cation struggle).
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B. NLRB-Provided Oversight for Players Associations as Certifi ed Exclusive 
Bargaining Agents 
Unlike the uncertainty of antitrust lawsuits, any certifi ed bargaining 
agent has the ability to use NLRB regulations to challenge their employer.161 
Congress adopted the NLRA and its amendments in order to provide “a[n] 
array of rules and remedies” for employee unions to challenge their employers 
outside the scope of antitrust law.162 The original Wagner Act, passed in 1935,
sought to signifi cantly change labor law through providing additional rights 
to employees and additional outlets for employee-management disputes.163 
Congress recognized that the only way to successfully implement the new labor 
rights was to establish “the type of administrative agency that had become a 
hallmark for much of the New Deal legislation.”164 With strict procedures and 
clear jurisdiction, the NLRB-regulated claims of unfair labor practices and bad 
faith negotiations provide labor unions with the stability necessary to challenge 
groups as powerful as sports leagues and team owners.165 Finally, the presence 
of a collective bargaining unit and subsequent bargaining relationship do not 
exclude a union from bringing a successful antitrust suit against its employer, 
while the decertifi cation of such union does preclude any unfair labor practice 
challenge under the Act.166
The presence of an exclusive bargaining agent and a collective bargaining 
relationship allow for parties to use economic sanctions. The players have the 
ability to strike, as set forth in the Act.167 However, even during a strike, a union 
161.  See  HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 27 (observing that the NLRA Act conferred 
a triad of essential rights: “(1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collectively; and 
(3) the right to engage in strikes [and other concerted activities]”).
162.  Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995)) (“Every employee who is locked out by 
a multiemployer group, every striker who is not reinstated, and every employee who is 
discharged could bring an antitrust action . . . Clearly, Congress had no such intention. As 
noted, the NLRA offers ‘a[n] array of rules and remedies . . . and . . . application of antitrust 
principles to a collective bargaining relationship would disrupt collective bargaining as we 
know it.’”).
163.  See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 26-27 (“Caught in the labyrinth of modern 
industrialism . . . the employee can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation 
with other employees.” (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert 
Wagner)).
164.  See id. at 28 (creating the Board).
165.  See generally WONG, supra note 5, at 520 (outlining the procedural process of 
fi ling an unfair labor charge with the Board).
166.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (“[A]n agreement among 
employers could be suffi ciently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not signifi cantly 
interfere with that process.”). The Brown decision also noted that investigation into the 
requirements of insulation from antitrust law should come from the Board “to whose 
‘specialized judgment’ Congress ‘intended to leave’ many of the ‘inevitable questions 
concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the future’.” See id. (quoting 
NLRB v. Truck Divers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)).
167.  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection . . . .”).
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is still bound to bargain in good faith.168 Employers, on the other hand, have 
the ability to “lockout” their employees as a negotiation tactic in collective 
bargaining.169 A likely provision in any CBA is a “no strike, no lockout” clause 
during the term of the CBA, which ensures that these economic sanctions will 
only be used if the agreement expires before a new one is signed.170 If there
is no exclusive bargaining unit, and thus no bargaining relationship, players 
would not have the statutory authority to strike,171 yet it remains unclear 
whether owners could lock out their employees.172 
From 1987–1989, the NFL played for two seasons without a collective 
bargaining agreement, with only a minor three-week strike in 1987.173 However, 
when the NFLPA decertifi ed in 1989, the owners lost their ability to lock out 
the players, but the players were also unable to bargain for any sort of benefi ts 
and were forced to play under the league’s unilateral provisions concerning 
free agency and salary caps.174 Thus, while a Board decertifi cation may ensure 
that the NBA will play the 2011 season, if the season occurs, the league and 
owners could attempt to unilaterally decide upon the provisions surrounding 
every season played where the players do not have an exclusive bargaining 
unit.175
168.  See § 158(b)(3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice . . . to refuse to bargain 
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to 
the provisions of section 159(a) . . . .”).
169.  See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (holding “an employer 
violates neither § 8(a) (1) nor § 8(a)(3) [of the Act] when, after a bargaining impasse 
has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the 
sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining 
position.”).
170.  See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 823–29 (discussing the 
economic uses of strikes and lockouts by bargaining parties).
171.  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (granting employees the right to engage in concerted 
activities “for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
172.  Compare WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95 (“[M]ultiple employers cannot 
conduct a lockout if there is no union”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 827 
(stating that economic sanctions can only be used “so long as bargaining is pursued in good 
faith and the lockout is utilized only after the bargaining process has reached stalemate or 
impasse.”).
173.  See id. at 545–46 (charting the NFL collective bargaining history from 1968 to 
2008, and including the 1987 player strike and the 1993 CBA signing).
174.  See generally Thomas George, N.F.L.’s 7-Year Plan Was Really 5 Years of 
Cheating History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at B15 (arguing that, prior to the 1993 NFL 
CBA, the league had instituted “a heavy-handed, one-sided free agency system” that 
produced only two free agent moves over fi ve years).
175.  See Coon, supra note 3 (noting that players not represented by a collective 
bargaining unit lose key protections and benefi ts).
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Collective bargaining relationships in sports often produce benefi ts to the 
players in return for sacrifi cing much of their “free market” abilities through 
restraints like the draft or salary cap.176 Both the NFL and NBA’s current 
agreements contain explicit sections concerning health care, as well as 
retirement and pension plans, which are all benefi ts the union has accrued 
in negotiations with their respective leagues.177 There will be little, if any 
incentive for the NBA to continue providing these benefi ts to the players in the 
event of union decertifi cation.178 As professional basketball can lead to long–
sustaining and career–ending injuries, the presence of a retirement and pension
plan is something of great value to all current, past, and future players in either 
league. Without a CBA—indeed—without a bargaining agent in general, it is 
unclear whether a pension plan would be as strong as the current plans are or 
if they the plans would exist at all.
Concerning player retirement, the short nature of professional athletic 
careers plays a role in pursuing actions against a league, as well as negotiations 
with leagues and owners. Between the lack of job security and the short length 
of a players’ career (as well as his earnings peak), the possibility of playing 
under unilateral salary restraints for any amount of time can jeopardize the 
earning capacity of NBA athletes.179 While the NFL players were ultimately 
successful in their lawsuits against the league in Powell–McNeil and White, 
the process from the 1987 strike to the 1993 court decisions lasted longer than 
an average NFL player’s career.180 Clearly, the success of these lawsuits comes 
at a price, while the ability to consistently play under mutually agreed-upon 
CBAs provides a more stable economic scheme for professional athletes. 
Therefore, the abilities of a decertifi ed union and its members to exact any 
change or to succeed in obtaining any benefi cial economic provisions pales 
in comparison to both the powers of a certifi ed union, as well as the limited 
capabilities of leagues who are obligated to negotiate with such unions under 
the NLRA.
176.  See Croke, supra note 90, at 176 (noting that collective bargaining negotiations 
produce benefi ts such as minimum team salaries, which would most likely be eliminated 
if a union decertifi ed); Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefi ts in Event of a Lockout, 
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/142994 
(explaining that the NFL league offi ce stated that if the two sides do not agree on a new 
CBA, the NFL would stop providing health care to NFL players and their families).
177.  See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 178, at 
arts. XLVI, XLVII (explaining the responsibilities of the team owners to provide health 
coverage and retirement benefi ts); 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 108, 
at arts. III, IV (same). 
178.  See, e.g., Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefi ts in Event of a Lockout, supra 
note 192 (illustrating that without a CBA, leagues will cut the costs of providing benefi ts 
for their players). 
179.  See Lock, supra note 23, at 385 (arguing that because of a lack of job scurity and 
a short average career length, NFL players are unlikely to reach their earning potential if 
they strike or play without a CBA).
180.  See generally How Long is the Average NFL Career?, LIVESTRONG, http://www.
livestrong.com/article/15527-long-average-career-nfl -player/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) 
(explaining that an average career in the NFL is 3.3 years).
2011]                                STRENGTH IN NUMBERS                             371 
C. Economic Realities of Salary Negotiations and the Failure of the Free 
Market Argument in Today’s Economy
One of the statutorily imposed mandatory subjects of collective bargaining 
is wages,181 and the collective bargaining unit makes a signifi cant difference 
in players’ wages today. In professional sports, there is a large disparity in the 
salaries of top players and the players who receive the minimum contract.182 
While it is possible to argue that the decertifi cation of a union and removal of 
a collective bargaining relationship would allow all players to receive their 
“free market worth,”183 this thought process is severely shortsighted.184 When 
the NBA attempted to decertify in 1995, it was led by superstars Michael 
Jordan and Patrick Ewing, who fought hard against the institution of a hard 
salary cap and received record-breaking salaries.185 Thus, the benefi t felt from 
the presence of a free market, or even the ability to circumvent certain salary 
restrictions, rises to the top.  
This, in contrast to the anticompetitive nature of unions under the Board, 
seeks uniformity within the ranks of the union.186 While the superstars of the 
NBA would probably see their contracts rise in a free market, there would be 
little, if any benefi cial effect for the majority of the league.187 Additionally, while 
players like Michael Jordan argued that there is a competitive disadvantage 
for “highly skilled” employees, much of the trade provisions in sports extend 
beyond specifi c salaries.188 While opponents of certifi cation may argue that 
the players associations would be committing unfair employee representation 
practices, such a claim is short sighted in light of Steele v. Louisville & 
181.  See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (specifying that collective bargaining units are the 
exclusive employee representatives allowed to collectively bargain for employees’ wages).
182.  See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6 (explaining 
that, while the mean salary is $2.6 million, half of players make less than $1.4 million).
183.  See McDonough supra note 6, at 859 (noting that the “non-statutory” labor 
exemption protects salary caps from antitrust claims).
184.  But cf. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 813 (conceding how diffi cult it 
would be for “star” players to complain of a CBA that would benefi t the majority of players 
to the star players’ detriment). 
185.  See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 4, 5, 6 
(explaining that when the 1996 CBA retained the salary cap, it also had a “Larry Bird” 
exception, under which Jordan was able to sign a one-year, $30 million contract). In Major 
League Baseball, when there was no salary cap, but only a “luxury tax,” the top salary was 
over $20 million more than the league minimum. See WEILER & ROBERTS , supra note 51, 
at 307 (explaining that in 2003, Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees received $22 
million salary in comparison to the league minimum of $300,00).
186.  See Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the 
NFL-NFLPA Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 406-07 (1996) (explaining that the 
union’s goal of reducing competition among employees regarding wages and conditions is 
accomplished when employers agree to establish uniform terms of employment).
187.  See generally Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6–7 
(discussing how, even with salary caps, bottom players tend to have little in the way of 
payouts compared to stars).
188.  See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 108, 
at arts. VII, X, XXVIII (regulating issues such discrimination, personal appearance, and 
injury grievances); 2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at arts. 
VI, XXVIII (incorporating attendance rules and telecom rights). 
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Nashville Railroad, which allows a union to make provisions for differing 
treatment among its members based on “competence and skill.”189
Uncertainty of decertifi cation extends additionally to the protections that a 
collective bargaining relationship provides to the union group as a whole in 
terms of wages, and that protection is vital in the economic realities of 2011.190 
The NBA’s current salary situation illustrates the problematic possibilities of 
employees working without the protections of Board-regulated negotiations.191 
With teams acting more conservative economically, either the disparity in 
salary will skyrocket between the best players and the rest of the league, or the 
lack of salary cap could result in a decrease in salaries in general.192 
Finally, the players may have a viable claim of bad faith bargaining against 
the owners due to the owners’ refusal to turn over fi nancial documents.193 The 
NBPA has questioned the league’s claims that teams are losing money in recent 
years, and the leagues and teams in general have not suffi ciently opened their 
189.  323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944); see, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-
2012, supra note 108, at art. XXIV, § 1(c) (listing several instances in which compensation 
can differ amongst players with different competency levels); 2005 [NBA] Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at art. VII, § 4 (same).
190.  But see Liz Mullen, Hunter: Talk of $400M NBA Loss ‘Baloney’, SPORTS BUS. 
J. (May 31, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2010/05/20100531/
This-Weeks-News/Hunter-Talk-Of-$400M-NBA-Loss-Baloney.aspx (expressing the view 
that while NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter does not believe that the NBA is losing 
$400 million, the NBA has already provided the union with boxes of fi nancial records in 
support of that claim). 
191.  Compare 2010 NBA Free Agents and Signings, BACKSEAT FAN, http://
backseatfan.com/2010/07/2010-nba-free-agents-and-signings/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) 
(charting how, in the summer of 2010, 9 NBA players signed a maximum or near-maximum 
allowable contract despite owners’ claims of fi nancial hardship), with WONG, supra note 
5, at 532 (noting that the removal of the salary fl oor would result in “tremendous cost 
savings at the players’ expense”).  See generally Michael J. Redding, Third and Long: 
The Issues Facing the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effect 
of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 102 (2009) (“Operating without a 
minimum salary requirement would allow the owners to set the market for free agents and 
rookies without any artifi cial salary fl oors.”).
192.  See Redding, supra note 109, at 102 (noting how the NFL owners believe that 
“the current fi nancial model is harming them by providing the players with too large of a 
revenue share”).
193.  Compare NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 755–56 (1956) (“Good faith 
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest 
claims . . . [if] . . . an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of 
bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.”), with 
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (stating that furnishing information to a union 
has been found to be an element of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith, but that 
fi rst a union must make a “good faith request for the information to be furnished” and that 
such information has to be relevant).
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books to the players’ association.194 While the law only requires an employer 
to disclose fi nancial documents when there is a stated “inability to pay,” the 
economic claims of the league may warrant an order to disclose fi nancial 
information.195 Even if a bad faith bargaining claim would be unsuccessful, 
forcing the NBA to claim that it could pay wages, but simply desires to lower 
them, would be a valuable bargaining chip in collective bargaining negotiations.
 The NBPA should remain certifi ed as the exclusive bargaining agent under 
the Board. Based on the stable options available to Board–certifi ed unions in 
collective bargaining and the benefi ts of administrative oversight, as well as 
the recent legal challenges in the NFL labor dispute, decertifying either union 
and attempting to individually bargain for contracts without a CBA in place 
will ultimately hurt the players as a group. 
194.  See Union Head Smith: NFL Owners Gearing Up for Lockout in 2011, NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl .com/news/story/09000d5d81b1858f/article/union-
head-smith-nfl -owners-gearing-up-for-lockout-in-2011 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) 
(describing the union representative’s complaints about the league’s willingness to turn 
over fi nancial documents).  Billy Hunter has repeatedly questioned David Stern’s claims 
of fi nancial loss and has requested additional documents. See Mullen, supra note 190 
(explaining that Hunter has requested “the sales prospectuses NBA teams have shown 
to buyers and would-be buyers of franchises in the last few years” to illustrate that teams 
are advertising themselves as profi table to potential buyers, while claiming losses to the 
union).
195. See Nielsen Lithographing Co. & Graphic Comms. Int’l Union, 305 N.L.R.B. 
697, 701 (1991) (holding that an employer also need not disclose its “projection of its future 
ability to compete” but that such estimation of its ability to compete is not “equate[d]” with 
its ability to pay).
